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Abstract: Private power production has sprung up all 
around the world, especially in developing countries with 
rapidly increasing demands and shortage of finance. BOT 
arrangements have emerged as one of the most important 
options of private power production. Based on oligopoly 
theory, this paper proposes a Stackelberg game model 
between a BOT company and a utility where they negotiate a 
long-term energy contract. It is assumed that a host utility 
purchases electricity from a BOT company at its “avoided 
cost”, and sells its electricity to end users at its average cost. 
Taking asymmetric pricing into account, our Stackelberg 
game model is transferred into a two-level optimization 
problem, and is then solved by an iterative algorithm. 
Keywords: Private power production, Build-Operate- 
Transfer, Game theory, lMo-level optimization. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A large amount of private power production has emerged 
as worldwide electrical power industry entering into a new 
era due to deregulation. Rapid demand growth and shortage 
of financial investment &om governments, private power 
production is encouraged into the traditionally monopolistic 
power industries in developing countries, among which BOT 
arrangement is becoming the most popular option, such as the 
700MW Shajiao-B power stations in China, 1200h4W Hab 
River project in Pakistan, 300 MW coal-fired projects in 
Philippines and 1000 MW Aliaga project in Turkey [1,2,3]. 
A BOT arrangement is one where a consortium of private 
companies to finance, build, operate an infrastructure project 
for a relative long specific period, and at the end of this 
concessionary period, when it has been estimated all 
investment costs have been recouped and a profit returned, 
transfer the project title &om the private consortium to the 
host. The long term nature of BOT arrangement gives rise to 
concerns of many kinds of fbture uncertainties which face 
BOT investors and the host with risks [SI. To mitigate risks, 
BOT investors usually ask for an important contract, “energy 
contract”, which stipulates how much energy of the BOT 
power plant is to be delivered, at what price and during what 
time periods [4]. In an energy contract, a minimal annual 
energy of the BOT power plant must be guarantee for 
delivery, by which the fixed investment cost and operating 
cost of a BOT power plant will be paid back. However, in the 
meantime the utility will lose dispatchability of the BOT 
power plant. 
In this paper a fixed amount of annual energy and a fixed 
energy price of a BOT Power plant are assumed, and fiom the 
point of view of oligopoly theory, a Stackelberg game model 
is proposed to describe the interaction between a BOT 
investor and a host utility in an energy contract negotiation. 
In addition, asymmetric pricing schemes are taken into 
account, where the host utility purchases electricity from the 
BOT power plant at a rate of “avoided cost” but sells its 
electricity to the end users at itself average cost. In fact, if 
both the BOT power plant and the host utility sell their 
electricity at their respective marginal costs, the social 
welfare optimal will be reached at the same time. Different 
pricing schemes make this bargaining more complicated. 
Game theory is a discipline that is used to analyze 
problems of conflict among interacting decision makers. 
Game theory has already been used for the analysis of 
electricity pricing and bargaining [6,7,8,9,10,11] in recent 
years. For example, J. Ruusunen, etc [6], applied cooperative 
game theory to analyze electricity exchange in a power pool, 
and a two-level hierarchical algorithm was proposed to solve 
the problem. A. Haurie, etc [7], modeled the interaction 
between a utility company and electricity cogenerators via a 
game theoretic, systems analysis approach, and a bilevel 
optimization technique was developed to compute the 
equilibrium. 
In the applications of game theory, recently oligopoly 
theory has been applied more and more because it has been 
realized that power markets are not perfect competitive more 
than oligopolistic markets. Obviously the game between a 
BOT investor and a host utility is a very case where the utility 
owns a leadership and a BOT power plant is a price taker. 
In addition, most of electricity pricing and bargaining 
models in literature mainly focused on real-time operation, 
and then discussed game players’ behaviors. The BOT 
arrangement is quit different, the model and analysis must 
involve long-term affects on the operation and planning of a 
power system. Therefore in our game model Long-term 
generation expansion planning (GEP) is adopted as a suitable 
tool to evaluate a BOT arrangement [4]. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: In 
Section I1 the game model is presented. In Section 111 the 
game model is transferred to a two-level optimization 
problem. In Section IV an iterative algorithm is developed to 
solve this optimization problem. In Section V the game 
model is applied to an illustrative example, and some 
analyses are conducted. Section VI concludes the paper. 
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IL ENERGY CONTRACT AND GAME MODEL 
Criticisms are often raised on BOT projects in developing 
countries, &er the project is in operation, on its high 
electricity prices andor annual energy outputs that are agreed 
by host utilities, and the effects of a BOT energy contract on 
long-term system scheduling and planning. Therefore, a 
rational decision-support model that can be used to analyze 
the efficiency of the contract is needed. In this paper, 
oligopoly theory is used for the negotiation and bargaining of 
a BOT energy contract. 
We use a simplified model that involvers a single-BOT 
power plant and a singleutility. An energy contract between 
the two is needed to negotiate. The BOT power plant can 
only sell its electricity to the host utility company, and the 
host utility company has an obligation to accept it at a rate of 
“avoided cost”. This kind of avoided cost should include 
capacity and energy cost savings of the utility, and thus long- 
term marginal cost is a closer concept. Here, breakeven cost 
proposed in [4] is adopted as the “avoided cost” because it 
involves the effects of a BOT power plant on the long-term 
generation expansion planning of power system. Meanwhile, 
the host utility company dominates the electricity market 
where it sells all of electricity to end users at a price of 
“average cost”. The relationship of a utility and a BOT power 
plant is illustrated in Figure 1. Here we simplify the scenario 
by assuming inelastic demands and fiee of uncertainties 
(some of which in fact can be taken into account in long-term 
generation expansion planning, such as demand uncertainty). 
Electric 
Utility 
at “avoided ax# 
Total electricity selling 
at “average cost I 
accumulative capacity of the BOT power plant 
until year n 
fixed investment cost of the BOT power plant 
variable cost of the BOT power plant 
fixed investment cost of the utility in year n 
variable cost of the host utility in year n 
breakeven cost for BOT’S electricity 
average cost of the host utility 
lifetime of the BOT power plant 
total cost of GEP without the BOT contract 
total cost of GEP with the BOT contract 
Payoff function: 
Utility: 
N 
fv = C [ D ”  *PA -(FCff +VCff * Q ~ ~ ) J - N * Q B ~ * P B  (1) 
n=l 
Constraints: 
(1) Energy balance 
(3) D” =QBOT +Q; n = l,2,..., N 
For each year, the total amount of electricity generated by 
the BOT power plant and the host utility should be exactly 
equal to the total demands. Here, the detail operational 
scheduling is not taken into account in our model even 
though it is a tough problem. 
.c (2) Capacity requirement 
End Users 
Figure 1 A Utility with a BOT Power Plant X; + X b T  2L” +R” n=1, 2,..., N (4) 
This BOT arrangement can be modeled as a Stackelberg 
game that can be depicted as follows. 
Notations: 
n a year in horizon period 
N horizon period of generation expansion planning 
D“ demandinyearn 
L” peak load in year n 
R” system reserve in year n 
QBm minimal annual electricity delivery from the 
BOTpower plant stipulated in the energy 
contract 
total electricity supply of the utility in year n 
accumulative capacity of the utility until year n 
QZ 
X,’j 
In order to meet the demand in each year, adequate system 
capacity in each year is required, and can be installed by the 
BOT investor and the host utility. In addition, to maintain a 
certain degree of system security, a system reserve margin of 
capacity must be kept, which also should be burdened by 
both the BOT investor and the host utility. 
(3) Other constraints 
In many cases, there are bounds on investments for both, 
the BOT investor and the host utility, and sometimes these 
constraints will have big affects on decision progress of each 
player. Nevertheless, for simplicity, we didn’t consider these 
fbctors in the paper. 
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Definition of breakeven cost: 
( 5 )  ‘0 - ‘BOT PB = Breakeven cost = 
=BOT QBOT 
The breakeven cost implies that the host utility purchases 
the BOT’s eledricity in such a way that the utility’s total 
generating cost in the horizon period of GEP should not 
change before and after the entry of the BOT power plant. Of 
course, the breakeven cost is the basic cost for the BOT 
power plant without a returned profit. Moreover the utility 
usually makes some changes referring to the breakeven cost 
according to corresponding policies in order to attract private 
inVestors. 
With the game model at hand, the equilibrium 
( QBm *,PE *) is our interest for the negotiating of the energy 
contract. In this game, Each player is concerned with the 
maximization of its benefic that is, each one maximizes its 
payoff function under the constraints. From the first order of 
necessary conditions, each one should sell its electricity at its 
respective marginal cost. Moreover, the two objective 
functions can be combined into a global payoff function, and 
optimal social welfare will be abtained. In fact, the electricity 
transaction between the BOT power plant and the utility will 
be cancelled out in the global payoff function. However, 
usually in developing countries electric utilities price their 
electricity based on their average costs, but in order to 
encourage private investment, “avoided cost’’ pricing 
mechanism is adopted. This kind of asymmetric pricing 
phenomenon makes the problem complicated. Therefore, we 
transfer our game model to a two-level optimization problem 
for computing the equilibrium. 
III. A TWO-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION 
FORMULATION 
Both the utility and the BOT power plant in our game 
model will maximize their incomings. However, the utility 
must take BOT’s electricity at its breakeven cost and sell all 
electricity to end users at its average cost. The BOT power 
plant can look for its maximum profit by adjusting its 
electricity output level under the breakeven cost pricing 
mechanism. So the game between a utility and a BOT power 
plant is a Stackelberg game. 
A Stackelberg game is a dynamic game model in which a 
dominant (or leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (or 
follower) firm moves second. It is straightforward to extend 
what follows to allow for more than one following firm. 
Usually static Stackelberg problems can be treated as a class 
of multi-level optimization problems. 
Even though our model is a Stackelberg model, the above 
price coupling mechanism is endogenous and requires the 
evaluation of both average and breakeven cost of the utility, 
so that common bilevel optimization techniques have 
difficulties to directly apply in the present problem. Therefore 
we restrict the equilibrium analysis of our model under the 
constraints of two existing pricing schemes, and formulate 
our game model as such a two-level optimization problem as 
follows: 
Objective: 
S.t. 
GEP with buying BOT Electricity at breakeven cost 
mm fBOT 
D” = QBOT + QC 
XC+X;IOT 2L”+R” n=1,2, ..., N 
n = 1’2, ..., N 
In our game model, the utility wants to maximize its net 
income by selling its electricity at average cost, thus it should 
behaves as if it just wants to minimize the total cost to satisfy 
the demand without any consideration about the electricity 
sale revenues. Therefore the long-term expansion planning is 
suitable for the utility to evaluate a BOT power plant, and a 
breakeven cost is calculated to price the electricity of a BOT 
power plant. The implementation of a long-term GEP with 
BOT electricity and the calculation of breakeven cost have 
been developed and discussed in our previous paper [4]. 
Breakeven Cost vs Capacity Factor 
A 
5 $1 
E m
p; 
L 
Figure 2 Breakeven Cost as a Function of Capacity Factor 
To calculate the equilibrium ( QBoT *, PB *), the relationship 
between QBOT and PB should be examined. Let us look at a 
simple case where there are only three types of power plants 
existing and for future expansion, whose average cost curves 
are illustrated in Figure 2. The average cost of a plant is equal 
to its fmed (capital) cost per unit of energy production 
summed with its variable (operating) cost, and may be 
computed according to the following expression: 
capital cost 
annual energy 
average cos t = op cost + 
capital cost 
capaciw factor 8760 
= opcost+ 
where opcost is the plant’s operating cost, and capacity factor 
of BOT power plant stands for the percentage of its energy 
output with respect to  its capacity. 
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Furthermore it is assumed that the capacity of each type of 
power plant can be added continuously in GEP. Then it is 
easy to get the curve of breakeven cost vs capacity factor, i.e., 
the black curve in Figure 2. It can be explained that the 
breakeven cost will be equal to the average cost of peak load 
plants if the capacity factor of the BOT power plant is 
smaller, and equal to the average cost of base load plants if 
larger. 
We further assume a BOT power plant is a shoulder load 
plant with cheaper fixed and variable cost than normal 
shoulder load plants, and its average cost is drawn in Figure 
2. Then the equilibrium point is easy to find for this simple 
case, which is shown in Figure 2, and it can be proven that 
the equilibrium point is unique. Comparing with the slop of 
BOT curve, the slop of the breakeven cost curve, is smaller at 
the left of equilibrium point, and larger at the right. This 
property can be used as a criterion to search the equilibrium 
point. Of course, calculated by a practical GEP such as in [4], 
the curve of breakeven cost vs capacity factor will be much 
more complicated, but the shape of the curve should be 
similar. 
Plant Type Energy Cost Capacity Cost 
1 I Nuclear 3 1750.0 
cmfwh) ($/kW 
IV. EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION 
Max Cap 
700 3 
(MW * No) 
Based on the above observation, an iterative algorithm for 
computing the equilibrium is developed. 
For the master optimization problem, a long-term 
expansion planning which integrates BOT constraints is a 
suitable tool [4], which should give the breakeven cost in the 
meantime. For the slave optimization problem facing the 
BOT power plant, a Newton-like solution is used in our 
algorithm. For convenience and clarity, the annual energy of 
the BOT power plant is replaced by its capacity factor in the 
description of our algorithm. 
Step 1:Set i=O. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Step 
Step 
(PHWR) 
1625.0 1000 * 3 Nuclear 4 
(Pm) 
500 * 18 coal 14 1062.5 
oil 21 812.5 200* 18 
LNGCIC 35 500.0 450 * 18 
Choose initial CFBOOT to its biggest capacity factor 
(because a BOT power plant usually wants to 
generate energy as much as possible). 
2: For the given CF&. , calculate breakeven cost 
PL and its lefthand and righthand local derivatives, 
Sk- and SA+ with respect to CFBOT using the 
approach in [4]. 
3: For the given CFLoT, calculate the average cost 
local derivative SLOT with respect 
toCFBoT on BOT average cost curve (which is 
first-order smooth). Interval Peak load Base load 
Present 5000 2500 
(Mw) 
C F ~ ;  = CF& +(a+l P; - AC;~,, ,  I)*( s;+ I-’ 
a is a small number to prevent a zero value of I PL - 
ACLOT 1. 
Step 5: Set i=i+l, go to step 2. 
L“(x) = (xd)’lc 
c*id d*103 
0.285 I 5 
In the algorithm, lefthand and righthand local derivatives 
are approximately calculated by changing CFBm at a time by 
a small amount and finding the new costs. 
Usually a BOT power plant has lower fixed and variable 
costs due to its efficient management. So at the equilibrium 
point, Pi 2 AC& . Even if Pi I ACioT,  higher return rate 
or allowances from the host utility based on some policies, 
still will make a BOT investor benefit fiom a BOT project. 
The policy issues are outside of the scope of the paper. 
V. NUMERICALEXAMPLES 
The proposed model and approach have been applied to an 
example system as described in [4]. The initial system, 
proposed plants and load data are listed in Table 1, 2 and 3, 
and a 20-year planning period is considered, which is divided 
into 5 time stages, each of four years duration. 
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The reserve is 1%. In addition, an annual discount rate of 
10% for both capital and operating expenses are used. 
In this example, a unit of type 5 is selected as a BOT 
power plant (peak load plant), which is introduced in the 
second stage, and whose capacity is 450MW. Moreover, we 
assume its capacity cost is cheaper by 35% than the noma1 
one of a same type of power plant, and its energy cost is 
same. Because breakeven cost just prices the basic cost the 
utility is willing to pay back to the BOT power plant, 35% 
reduction of the energy cost of the BOT power plant is to 
make its payoff much positive in order to examine our model 
and approach. 
ACBoT 
BOT 
payoff 
($M) 
Table 4 Breakeven Cost and Average Cost vs Cauacity 
53.05 31.6 24.5 20.9 18.75 17.32 16.3 
2.712 5.613 8.199 9.46 5.992 -0.79 -8.8 
- -  
Factor of the BOT Pow& Plant I capacity I 0.05 1 0.1 I 0.15 I 0.2 I 0.25 I 0.3 1 0.35 1 factor I 53.91 I 32.49 I 25.36 I 21.64 I 19.13 I 17.27 I 15.9 I 
=O 1 
50 
40 
T 
Pri& 
30 
20 
lo 0 F 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 
Capacity Factor 
Figure 3 Breakeven Cost and Average Cost vs Capacity 
Factor of the BOT Power Plant 
Using our game model and solution, the equilibrium is 
reached at ( CFBo, *, Ps *) = (0.19, 22.26). Some results 
during calculating the equilibrium point are shown in Table 4 
and Figure 3. In fact, in the long-term generation expansion 
planning the BOT power plant takes the place of a unit of 
type 5 in the original GEP without the BOT entry. However 
that unit has different capacity factors in different years, 
which range fiom 0.098 to 0.31, meanwhile the annual 
capacity factors of the BOT power plant are fixed. This kind 
of nondispatchability presented by a BOT power plant causes 
many economic dispatch problems, and E121 discussed this 
issue and proposal some approaches to communicate the vale 
of dispatchability fro non-utility generation projects. 
It has been shown that, the electricity price and fixed annul 
energy of a BOT power plant can be determined 
simultaneously in our game model, and the annul capacity 
fictor of the BOT power plant is forced to go close to one of 
a same type of power plant in original GEP. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we show how game theory can be used to 
evaluate a popular private power production: BOT 
arrangements. Using oligopoly theory, a Stackelberg game 
model between a BOT company and a utility is propsed, and 
which is applied to the negotiation and bargaining of a long- 
term energy contract. In our model, asymmetric pricing 
schemes of “avoided cost” and “average cost” are considered. 
To compute the equilibrium point of this Stackelberg game, it 
is transferred to a two-level optimization problem, and then is 
solved by an iterative algorithm. Finally our model and 
approach are demonstrated by being applied to a test system. 
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